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EVOLVING CONCEPTS OF THE
INNKEEPER'S LIEN*
Man's existence depends upon compromising his own interests
with the general interests of society. In fulfilling his personal needs
and desires, an individual must often comply with customs or laws
adopted by the community. The innkeeper' and the guest,2 for
example, have been able to accommodate their differing priorities
by adhering to certain common-law principles. The laws that have
governed the innkeeper-guest relationship for centuries, and that
have been carried down to the present time,3 with certain limitations
imposed by statute, appropriately illustrate this necessity to com-
promise.
The obligation of the innkeeper to receive all travelers for
whom accommodations were available 4 and his extraordinary re-
sponsibility to safeguard the goods of the guest 5 led to the develop-
* I would like to express my appreciation to Professor John H. Sherry who gave me the
inspiration to do research on the innkeeper's lien.
1 An innkeeper is one who professes to serve the public by keeping an inn. His regular
business is to entertain and accommodate any traveler who arrives in a condition fit to be
received and who promises to pay an adequate price. As subsequently used in this Note, an
innkeeper is also referred to as a hotelkeeper.
2 A guest is a transient who receives accommodations at an inn for reasonable compensa-
tion. It is the transient character of the visit, that is, its indefinite or temporary duration, which
distinguishes a guest from a lodger, boarder, or tenant in a hotel. However, as is pointed out in
40 AM. JutR. 2d Hotels, Motels, and Restaurants § 14, at 910-11 (1968):
It is difficult, if not impossible, to define with precision who is a guest, as distin-
guished from a boarder, lodger, or roomer, and each case is to be determined by all
the circumstances thereof. Generally, a guest is one who is a transient, that is, free to
go and come as he pleases, and who does not sojourn in the inn for a specified time or
permanently, and he is entertained from day to day without any express contract,
whereas a boarder or lodger contracts for accommodations for a definite period and
usually has an arrangement for payment of a fixed sum of money at definite
intervals. Under some statutes, however, the term "guest" is defined to include a
boarder, lodger, or roomer.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
For example, New York's first Constitution provided:
And this convention doth further, in the name and by the authority of the good
people of this state, ORDAIN, DETERMINE AND DECLARE that such parts of the
common law of England, and of the statute law of England and Great Britain... shall
be and continue the law of this state ....
N.Y. CONST. art. XXXV (1777). Similar provisions were included in subsequent versions of
the New York Constitution and are presently embodied in article I, § 14 of the constitution
of 1938. The innkeeper's lien rested wholly upon the common law prior to statutory enact-
ment in 1897. See 27 N.Y. JuR. Hotels, Restaurants, and Motels § 93, at 384 (1963).
" See, e.g., Perrine v. Paulos, 100 Cal. App. 2d 655, 657, 224 P.2d 41, 42 (1950); Vansant
v. Kowalewski, 28 Del. (5 Boyce) 92, 90 A. 421 (Super. Ct. 1914); J. BEALE, LAw OF INNKEEPERS
AND HOTELS § 61, at 42 (1906).
5 With few exceptions, such as acts of God, inherent defects in the property, or negli-
gence of the guest, the innkeeper was absolutely liable for any injury or loss to the guest's
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ment of the innkeeper's lien.6 By custom, the innkeeper was given
the power to execute a lien on the property of the guest to compen-
sate for expenses in keeping the goods, as well as for the food and
entertainment provided.7 This quid-pro-quo system 8 effectively de-
fined and continues to define9 the contours of the relationship
between innkeeper and guest. Any disturbance of this state of affairs
can therefore be justified only under the most compelling of circum-
stances.
The constitutional validity of the innkeeper's lien has recently
been questioned in a number of states.' 0 The New York Court of
Appeals case ofBlye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co. " is representative of
property. See Burton v. Drake Hotel Co., .237 Ill. App. 76 (1925); Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Altamont Springs Hotel Co., 206 Ky. 494, 267 S.W. 555 (1925); Todd v. Natchez-Eola
Hotels Co., 171 Miss. 577, 157 So. 703 (1934). The innkeeper was not, however, obligated to
accept an item that was extremely dangerous, such as a wild animal or package of dynamite, or
that might create a nuisance. See J. BEALE, supra note 4, § 68, at 47; J. SCHOULER, LAW OF
BAILMENTS 258 (1880).
6 See Hogan, The Innkeeper's Lien at Common Law, 8 HASTINGS L.J. 33, 43-48 (1956).
7 In L.E. Lines Music Co. v. Holt, 332 Mo. 749, 60 S.W.2d 32, (1933), the court pointed
out that
[t]his extraordinary privilege corresponds to, and is concurrent with, the extra-
ordinary liabilities which the law imposes on the innkeeper. The lien is not created
by a contract, but by law; the innkeeper, being obliged by law to receive the guest, is
given the lien by the lai as a protection.
Id. at 753, 60 S.W.2d at 33, quoting 32 C.J. Innkeepers § 84, at 569 (1923).
8 For a compilation of references supporting the proposition that, at common law, an
innkeeper had a lien upon all goods rightfully possessed by the guest for the value of the
guest's board and lodging, see Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 189 N.Y. 302, 309-13, 82 N.E. 143,
144, 145-47 (1907).
9 For example, the introduction of the automobile and other advanced modes of trans-
portation have enabled the guest to escape more easily with his goods as well as to avoid service
of process. See text accompanying note 76 infra. And although no empirical studies are
available to illustrate the practical effectiveness of the lien in terms of the frequency of its
execution, the exercise of the lien by certain types of hotels as applied to certain kinds of
guests, and the actual monetary compensation an innkeeper derives from its execution, the
lien does serve the important practical function of deterring a guest from defaulting on
payments due and owing the innkeeper.
10 Finding state action to be present, four courts have held the innkeeper's lien uncon-
stitutional as violative of procedural due process. Johnson v. Riverside Hotel, Inc., 399 F.
Supp. 1138 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33
N.Y.2d 15,300 N.E.2d 710,347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the Illinois innkeeper's lien in Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 527
F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975), on the basis that state action was not involved, and the First Circuit
Court of Appeals applied the same rationale in upholding a boardinghousekeeper's lien in
Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975).
11 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973).
In Blye, a third-month resident of a Manhattan hotel, Judy Blye, was temporarily de-
prived of her possessions when she failed to make payment for one week's hotel charges. An
action for a dedaratoryjudgment was therefore instituted challenging the constitutionality of
the innkeeper's lien law.
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the legal issues that have confronted the courts and will therefore be
used as a vehicle to assess present and future attacks on the lien. In
Blye, the court held that a state statute codifying the common-law
lien of the innkeeper 12 was unconstitutional because it did not com-
ply with the procedural due process requirements of notice and
hearing 13 prior to the detention of a hotel resident's property. In
reaching this decision, the court found that the innkeeper's conduct
constituted state action since the execution of a lien was traditionally
a function performed by an agent of the state14 and since the
innkeeper's actions were clothed with the authority of state law.'5
The court also noted that the innkeeper's lien was irreconcilable
with the concepts of due process developed in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.16 and Fuentes v. Shevin.17 While conceding that an
Although Blye's property had been returned to her after the filing of the complaint, the
court held that the case was not moot because the appellant's cause of action involved an
outstanding claim for monetary damages. The court concluded that "[t]he due process and
search and seizure issues [were], therefore, 'live' and the controversyjusticiable."Id, at 19, 300
N.E.2d at 713, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 174 (citations omitted).
The court also intimated that the execution of an innkeeper's lien might constitute a
violation of the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. A
detailed discussion of this point, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
12 At the time suit was brought in Ble, the New York innkeeper's lien statute provided
that
[a] keeper of a hotel, apartment hotel, inn, boarding house, rooming house or
lodging house, except an emigrant lodging house, has a lien upon, while in posses-
sion, and may detain the baggage and other property brought upon his premises by a
guest, boarder, roomer or lodger, for the proper charges due from him, on account
of his accommodation, board, room and lodging, and such extras as are furnished at
his request. If the keeper of such hotel, apartment hotel, inn, boarding, rooming or
lodging house knew that the property brought upon his premises was not, when
brought, legally in possession of such guest, boarder, roomer or lodger, or had notice
that such property was not then the property of such guest, boarder, roomer or
lodger, a lien thereon does not exist. An apartment hotel within the meaning of this
section includes a hotel wherein apartments are rented for fixed periods of time,
either furnished or unfurnished, to the occupants of which the keeper of such hotel
supplies food, if required. A guest of an apartment hotel, within the meaning of this
section, includes each and every person who is a member of the family of the tenant
of an apartment therein, and for whose support such tenant is legally liable.
N.Y. LtEN LAw § 181 (McKinney 1966).
"a See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972); Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Wisconsin
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390
(N.D. Ill. 1972) (invalidating Illinois's innkeeper lien law on due process grounds); Klim v.
Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (invalidating California's innkeeper lien law on due
process grounds).
14 See note 48 and accompanying text infra.
1-1 See note 40 and accompanying text infra.
16 395 U.S. 337 (1969). In Sniadach, Family Finance Corporation brought a garnishment
action against Mrs. Sniadach as defendant and her employer as garnishee. The complaint
alleged that $420 was presently due on a promissory note. In accordance with Wisconsin law,
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:587
extraordinary situation might justify summary seizure without due
process safeguards,' 8 the B lye court failed to find any public interest
that would meet this exception. Furthermore, the court could not
perceive how the lien afforded an innkeeper any real protection
against a guest intent on absconding. It concluded that the interests
of a guest in the possession and use of his property were paramount
to any interests of the hotelkeeper in satisfying a claim against the
guest by means of prejudgment seizure.' 9
In striking down the innkeeper's lien, the Blye court failed to
distinguish innkeeper's liens from liens employed in other types of
one-half of the wages under the control of the garnishee were paid to the defendant as a
"subsistance allowance" and the remainder was retained subject to order of the court. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and
invalidated the state's garnishment statute because it authorized garnishment of a debtor's
wages without adequate notice or a prior opportunity to be heard.
17 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Fuentes involved actions instituted by debtors in Florida and
Pennsylvania challenging the constitutionality of the states' prejudgment replevin laws. The
Florida appellant purchased a gas stove and a service policy under a conditional sales contract
from the Firestone Company. After two-thirds of the contract amount was paid, a dispute
arose regarding servicing of the stove. The appellant refused further payments and Firestone
instituted a claim for replevin. The Pennsylvania appellants presented similar facts.
The replevin laws of both states enabled a private party, without a hearing or prior notice
to the debtor, to obtain a writ of replevin upon an exparte application to an official of the state
and upon the posting of a bond. Delivery of the writ of replevin to the sheriff required him by
law to seize the property described therein. The defendant had a subsequent right to reclaim
possession of that property by posting his own security bond. The Supreme Court, in a
four-to-three opinion, held that these replevin acts violated the due process rights of the
defendants by depriving them of their property without a prior opportunity to be heard on
the validity of the underlying claim.
18 Sniadach and Fuentes were cited in support of this proposition, but the court neverthe-
less concluded that "[ilt cannot be said that the statute before us serves such an important
governmental or general public interest." 33 N.Y.2d at 21,300 N.E.2d at 714,347 N.Y.S.2d at
176.
19 Normally, in cases in which the necessity for prior notice and a hearing has been
examined, the courts have employed a balancing test to weigh the countervailing public and
private interests. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430
(5th Cir. 1970); Goliday v. Robinson, 305 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Ill. 1969). One frequently cited
opinion has described the balancing test in the following manner:
[T]o determine in any given case what procedures due process requires, the court
must carefully determine and balance the nature of the private interest affected and
of the government interest involved, taking account of history and the precise
circumstances surrounding the case at hand.
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1967).
The court in Blye, however, did not use the traditional balancing test in weighing the
countervailing public and private interests of the innkeeper and the guest. The court merely
focused on the lien's "disastrous" effects upon the guest, ignoring the lien's traditional
function as an equalizing device to compensate the innkeeper for his legal obligation to receive
the guest and safeguard his property.
The connection between the innkeeper's liability and the innkeeper's lien at common law
was discussed in Threfall v. Borwick, L.R. 7 Q.B. 711, 713-14 (1872). See note 25 infra. See also
Broadwood v. Granara, 156 Eng. Rep. 499 (Ex. 1854).
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business activity. In its analysis, the court did not differentiate be-
tween a guest, to whom the common-law innkeeper's lien applied,
and a lodger or tenant, to whom liens were initially applied by
statute rather than by common law. In addition, the court resorted
to a strained interpretation of the cases it cited, unduly expanding
their meaning and application in order to buttress its own conclu-
sion. Its finding that the lien sufficiently involved the state so as to
constitute state action 20 and its belief that the innkeeper had alterna-
tive measures at his disposal other than the lien are both of ques-
tionable validity.2 1 The purpose of this Note is to examine the
constitutional validity of the innkeeper's lien in terms of the histori-
cal relationship existing between an innkeeper and his guest, the
conduct of the innkeeper as constituting state or private action, the
legal bases for invoking fourteenth amendment procedural due
process requirements, and the alternative measures that may be
available to the innkeeper.
I
SCOPE OF THE INNKEEPER'S LIEN
Although the innkeeper's lien dates back to Roman law, the
common-law concept of the lien originated in Medieval England. At
that time a traveler had to contend with poorly constructed roads,
and a variety of robbers and outlaws. He was thus compelled to seek
nightly shelter for his own personal safety22 and for the protection
of his property. 23
20 In finding state action, the court cited other types of liens as involving an agent of the
state, and added that "innkeepers are possessed of certain powers by virtue of section 181 of
the Lien Law." 33 N.Y.2d at 20, 300 N.E.2d at 714, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 175. Unlike the
innkeeper's lien, which has always been exercised by the innkeeper in his capacity as a private
citizen, the other types of liens cited in Blye, including a writ of attachment and a judgment
lien, have traditionally been exercised by a sheriff as an agent of the state. See notes 45-49 and
accompanying text infra.
Keepers of apartment hotels, boardinghouses, roominghouses, or lodginghouses are
granted, the powers of the lien by virtue of § 181, but this section does not provide innkeepers
with any additional powers not granted at common law. The statutory language is similar in
import to the common-law rule expressed by Judge Chase in Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 189
N.Y. 302, 309, 82 N.E. 143, 146 (1907): "[A]n innkeeper has a lien at common law upon all
goods in the rightful possession of his guest for the value of the guest's entertainment."
21 See notes 108-17 and accompanying text infra.
22 See, e.g., Bowling v. Lewis, 261 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1958); St. Paul Hotel Co. v. Lohm,
196 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1952); Clancy v. Barker, 71 Neb. 83, 98 N.W. 440 (1904); Shank v.
Riker Restaurants Associates, 28 Misc. 2d 835, 216 N.Y.S.2d 118, aff'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 458,
222 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1961); Danner v. Arnsberg, 227 Ore. 420, 362 P.2d 758 (1961); Rommel v.
Schambacher, 120 Pa. 579, 11 A. 779 (1887).
23 See Navagh, A New Look at the Liability ofInn Keepers for Guest Property Under New York
1976]
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Recognizing the imperiled position of the traveler and his re-
liance upon the innkeeper, the English courts created a special
liability of the innkeeper, based not on tort or contract principles,
but rather on what has been called the "custom of the realm. '2 4 The
common-law precedents, including the extraordinary liabilities of
the innkeeper,2 5 were subsequently brought to America in colonial
times.
With the improvement of traveling conditions in the colonies,
the dangers to a guest's property were reduced. In addition, insur-
ance for the traveler became increasingly available. In light of these
circumstances, it appeared inequitable to impose the expanded and
virtually unlimited common-law liability upon the hotelkeeper, who
usually had no knowledge of the value of the property of his guests.
Legislation was thus enacted in New York26 and other states27 to
Law, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 62, 63 (1956). See, e.g., Bidlake v. Shirley Hotel Co., 133 Colo. 166,
292 P.2d 749 (1956); Coskery v. Nagle, 83 Ga. 696, 10 S.E. 491 (1889); Layton v. Seward
Corp., 320 Mich. 418, 31 N.W.2d 678 (1948); Hulett v. Swift, 33 N.Y. 571 (1865); Southwest-
ern Hotel Co. v. Rogers, 183 S.W.2d 751 (1944), aff'd, 143 Tex. 343, 184 S.W.2d 835 (1945);
Shifflette v. Lilly, 130 W. Va. 297, 43 S.E.2d 289 (1947).
24 "It was the custom of the realm to impose special duties upon certain callings which
involved public confidence and the exercise of special skills and competence." Note, The
Innkeeper's Lien in the Twentieth Century, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 175, 176 (1971).
25 Rex v. Ivens, 173 Eng. Rep. 94, 96 (1835), stated:
The innkeeper is not to select his guests. He has no right to say to one, you shall come
into my inn, and to another you shall not, as every one coming and conducting
himself in a proper manner has a right to be received; and for this purpose innkeep-
ers are a sort of public servants ....
The concomitant principle was expressed by justice Mellor in Threfall v. Borwick, L.R. 7 Q.B.
711, 713-14 (1872):
[W]hen, having accommodation, [the innkeeper] has received the guest with his
goods and thereby has become liable for their safe custody, it would be hard if he was
not to have a lien upon them. And under such circumstances the lien must be held to
extend to goods which he might possibly have refused to receive.
And in Cook v. Kane, 13 Ore. 482, 11 P. 226 (1886), the court observed that
[w]henever, by virtue of the relation of innkeeper and guest, the law imposes this
extraordinary responsibility for the goods of the guest, it gives the innkeeper a
corresponding security upon the goods put by the guest into his possession.
Id. at 485-86, 11 P. at 228.
26 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 200 to 203-a, 207 (McKinney 1968); N.Y. LIEN LAw § 181
(McKinney 1966).
27 ALA. CODE tit. 24, §§ 11, 13-15, 17-19 (Supp. 1973); id. tit. 33, §§ 11-12, 15, 17-19
(1958); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 08.56.050, .060 (1973); id. §§ 34.35.510, .520, .530 (1975); Amz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 33-302, -951, -952 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-1109 to -1112 (1957); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1861 (West 1954 & Supp. 1975); id. §§ 1859-61; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 38-20-102, -104, 12-44-105 to -112 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1, -2, 49-69
(1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 509.111, 713.67-.68, 85.011-.051 (Supp. 1975-76); GA. CODE Am.
§§ 52-105, -106, -108, -111 (1974); HAwAu REV. STAT. §§ 507-7 to -10 (1968); IDAHO CODE
§§ 39-1824, -1826, -1827 (1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 71, §§ 1, 3-4 (Smith-Hurd 1959 & Supp.
1975-76); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 32-8-27-1 to -2, 32-8-28-1 to -5 (Burns 1973); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 105.1-.9, 583.1-.2, .4 (1949); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-201 to -203, -402 (1973); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 306.010-.030 (Baldwin 1971); id. §§ 376.340-.350 (Baldwin 1969); LA. Civ.
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protect the innkeeper from fraudulent claims, and to place upon the
guest a portiofl of the risk of loss. These statutes imposed certain
limitations upon the amount that a guest could recover at common
law for the loss of, or damage to, his property.28 The limitations
were dependent upon the nature of the property and its location in
the hotel at the time the loss or damage occurred.
Although these statutes were designed to limit the innkeeper's
liability, he was nevertheless left with more responsibilities and
fewer safeguards than his commercial counterparts, the landlord
and the roominghouse proprietor. In contrast to the boardinghouse
or roominghouse proprietor, the innkeeper was under a common-
law duty to provide accommodations to all persons, often without
regard to any prior or express agreement as to the duration of their
stay.2 9 In addition, the common law continued to place a greater
CODE ANN. art. 3236 (West Supp. 1975); id. arts. 2937, 2965, 2971, 3232-34 (West 1952); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 2901-04, 2951, 2952 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 71, §§ 3-4 (1970);
MAss. ANN. LAWS. ch. 255, §§ 26-29 (Supp. 1974); id. ch. 150, § 10 (1972); id. ch. 255, §§ 23,
26-30 (1968); MiCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 18.301-.303, .311, .312 (1971); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 327.01-.06 (1966); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-73-1 to -17 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 419.010
(Vernon Supp. 1975); id. §§ 419.010-.030, .060 (Vernon 1949); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 41-122,
41-123, 41-123.01-.04, 41-124 to -125, 41-127 to -128 (1974); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 353:1,
444:1, 448:1 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:44-48 to -50 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-6-1
(1966); id. §§ 61-3-11 to -14 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 72.2-.3 (1975); id. §§ 44A-2 to -5
(1974); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 35-19-01, -02, 60-01-29 to -33 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4721.01-.06 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 501, 503a, 503b (17966); ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 87.525 to .530, 699.010-.050 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, §§ 63-64, 71-72 (1954);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 5-14-1 to -2 (1956); id. §§ 34-33-1 to -2 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-4
(Supp. 1974); id. §§ 35-3 to -6 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 44-11-5 (Supp. 1975); id.
§§ 43-40-4 to -6, 44-11-5, -7 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-703 to -706, -709,64-1701 (1955);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4592,4594-95 (1960); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 29-1-2 to -3 (1969);
id. §§ 38-2-2, -4 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 3141-43 (1971); id. tit. 13, § 2585 (1974); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-10 to -11, -13, 43-31, -34 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.48.030,
19.48.070,60.64,010 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-14 (Supp. 1975); id. § 16-6-22 (1972);
id. §§ 38-11-5, -14 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 289.48 (Supp. 1975-76); id. §§ 160.31-.33 (1974);
id. § 289.43-.48 (1958).
Those state statutes not placing monetary limitations on the amount the guest could
recover include the following: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1502, tit. 25, § 3901 (1974); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. §§ 34-102 to -103, -109 to -110 (1961); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 108.480, 651.010
(1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-247, -249 (1959).
28 In New York, for example, the hotelkeeper was not obligated to receive property for
safekeeping exceeding $500 in value. The hotel was not liable for any loss of property, by theft
or otherwise, exceeding this figure, except when there was a special agreement in writing. See
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 200 to 203-a, 207 (McKinney 1968).
Because the potential liability of an innkeeper already existed at common law, New York's
lien law did not create a new liability, but merely limited the amount of a guest's recovery. See
Navagh, supra note 23, at 64 citing Honig v. Riley, 244 N.Y. 105, 110, 155 N.E. 65, 67 (1926),
and Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N.Y. 172 (1870).
29 See Sherry, Innkeeper's Liabilityfor Failure to Honor Reservations, 15 CORNELL HOTEL &
RESTAURANT ADMIN. Q. 72, 73 (May 1974). In Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am.
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burden upon the innkeeper to maintain the safe condition of his
premises.30 The burden of these responsibilities was compounded
by the innkeeper's inability to ensure the collection of charges in-
curred by the guest, for, unlike the landlord, the innkeeper was not
afforded the common-law protection of a security deposit.3 1
The legal duties placed upon the innkeeper with respect to the
operation of his inn and his relationship with his guests thus justified
affording him the protection of a lien. Proprietors of boarding-
houses and lodginghouses, on the other hand, always retained
sufficient control and flexibility over associations with their guests; a
lien was therefore unnecessary as a protective device. 32 Further-
Dec. 657 (1867), the court distinguished an inn from a private lodging or boardinghouse in
the following manner:
mhe keeper of the latter is at liberty to choose his guests, while the innkeeper is
obliged to entertain and furnish all travellers of good conduct and means of pay-
ment, everything which they have occasion for as such travellers, whilstbn their way.
Id. at 583.
30 A tenant acquired an interest in the realty of his landlord, or a right to the exclusive
possession of the premises occupied, and was therefore obligated properly to maintain his
living quarters. Because an innkeeper's guest did not acquire any realty interest, he was not
responsible for keeping the premises safe and clean; that task devolved upon the innkeeper.
See, e.g., 49 Am. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 6, at 47-48 (1970), wherein it is stated:
The chief distinction between a tenant and a lodger apparently rests in the
possession. A tenant has the exclusive legal possession of the premises, he and not the
landlord being in control and responsible for the care and condition of the premises.
A lodger, on the other hand, has merely a right to the use of the premises, the
landlord retaining the control and being responsible for the care and attention
necessary.
31 Along with this greater burden, however, came an inchoate right to a lien on the goods
of the innkeeper's guest as of the time board and lodging were furnished. The lien became
fixed and certain only after the indebtedness was established, and it remained in effect until
the innkeeper voluntarily surrendered the goods to the guest or until the debt was satisfied. In
the landmark case of Robinson v. Walter, 81 Eng. Rep. 227 (1616), Justice Dodderidge
asserted the innkeeper's common-law right to the lien: "He is [bound] to receive all guests and
horses that come to his inn ... and therefore there is very great reason for him to [execute the
lien]." Id. See also, e.g., Broadwood v. Granara, 156 Eng. Rep. 499 (1854); Threfall v. Borwick,
L.R. 7 Q.B. 711 (1872); Coates v. Acheson, 23 Mo. App. 255 (K.C. Ct. App. 1886); Cook v.
Prentice, 13 Ore. 482, 11 P. 226 (1886).
32 Historically, the keeper of a boardinghouse or lodginghouse was not extended the
prerogative of a lien. See notes 127-28 and accompanying text infra. He was required to resort
to a normal civil action to recover charges due. The availability of the common-law lien was
limited strictly to innkeepers. See Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. Dec. 657
(1867); Turner v. Priest, 48 Ga. App. 109, 171 S.E. 881 (1933); Pollock v. Landis, 36 Iowa 651
(1873); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Miller, 52 Minn. 516, 55 N.W. 56 (1893); Cochrane v. Schryver, 12
Daly 174 (N.Y.C.P. 1883); 1 L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LIENS § 513, at 462 (3d ed.
1914). Many modern statutes, however, have extended the lien to one or both of the above
categories. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-302, -951, -952 (1974); CAL. CIv. CODE
§§ 1859-61 (West 1954 & Supp. 1975); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 52-105, -106, -108, -111 (1974);
MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 255, §§ 26-29 (Supp. 1974); id. ch. 140, § 10 (1972); id. ch. 255, §§ 23,
26-30 (1968); MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 18.301-.303, .311-.312 (1971); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. §§ 34-102 to -103, -109 to -110 (1961); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 108.480,651.010 (1973); N.H.
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more, a hotel guest, because of his transient status, ordinarily
traveled very light and was ready and able to leave at a moment's
notice. A lodger or boarder, however, usually entered into a rela-
tively long-term contract with the owner and consequently did not
have the mobility to default easily on payments. These distinctions,
virtually ignored by the Blye court,33 are important in evaluating
those statutes that extend the privilege of the innkeeper's lien to
boardinghouse and lodginghouse keepers.3 4 In considering propos-
als for a modified lien law, deference should also be given to the
public policies that under common law resulted in granting only the
innkeeper a right to the lien. 5
II
INNKEEPER'S LIEN AND STATE ACTION
The notice and hearing requirements related to prejudgment
seizures are, in large part, predicated upon Title 42 of the United
States Code, section 1983,36 which creates a civil cause of action for
the deprivation of constitutional rights. To recover under this stat-
ute a guest must prove that an innkeeper deprived him of a right
secured by the Constitution, such as freedom from deprivation of
property without due process of law,37 and that the deprivation
occurred "under color of state law." The latter element will normally
be present whenever state action sufficient to violate the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause is found. Thus, the issue is readily
discussed primarily in terms of state action.38 If the innkeeper-
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 353:1, 444:1 (1966); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 200 to 203-a, 207 (McKinney
1968); N.Y. LIEN LAW § 181 (McKinney 1966); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4592, 4594,
4595 (1960); WXs. STAT. ANN. § 289.48 (Supp. 1975-76); id. §§ 160.31-.33 (1974); id. §§ 289.43-
.48 (1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-247, -249 (1959).
33 InBlye the court struck down a statute that encompassed not only innkeepers but also
proprietors of boardinghouses, lodginghouses, and roominghouses, thereby failing to take
into account the important differences among these classifications.
U See statutes cited in note 27 supra.
'5 See notes 118-28 and accompanying text infra.
36 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within thejurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
37 "[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38 Subsequent to the Supreme Court decision in Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the
primary development and expansion of the state-action doctrine has occurred in racial
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creditor's remedy does not in any manner involve the state through
statute, court, or officer, such prejudgment seizure will not violate
the due process clause.
The Blye case involved a summary seizure of personal property
by a private creditor, the innkeeper, without state participation and
without any direct action or review by state officials. In this context,
any possible state involvement would only come "after the fact, after
the [seizure had] taken place."39 Although Blye concerned the pri-
vate act of an innkeeper, the court held that the innkeeper was
clothed with the authority of state law and was therefore infringing
upon the guest's constitutional rights. 40 The court did not distin-
guish whether a seizure made under the common law, as opposed to
discrimination cases involving the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. State
action has been found to exist in the following situations: Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967) (state constitutional amendment prohibiting legislative enactment of open-housing
laws); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (discrimination in the operation of park owned by
city, but turned over to private trustees); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) (health
regulations which encouraged segregation); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715 (1961) (operation of privately leased restaurant in state-owned building); Pennsyl-
vania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) (operation of private college whose organiza-
tion was authorized by state law); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (discrimination by
private political club in voting in pre-primary election); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(court enforcement of racially restrictive covenant in a real estate deed); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946) (exercise of governmental powers in privately owned company town);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (nominating elections conducted by private, segre-
gated political parties).
When an attack is launched against a creditor, however, at least initially the applicability
of the above-cited cases involving racial discrimination may be questioned. This argument was
developed in Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay On
the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 1003, (1973), wherein the authors pointed out
that:
First, a creditors' rights case will not involve an attack upon conduct whose elimina-
tion was the motivating force behind the adoption of the fourteenth amendment.
Unlike racial discrimination, the conduct under attack will not be inherently iniqui-
tous and, in fact, may have positive value....
While these considerations do not dictate the wholesale scrapping of 100 years of
state action adjudication in equal protection cases involving issues of racial discrimi-
nation, they may be instrumental in shaping future development of the state action
doctrine in the creditor-debtor due process area. At the very least, they permit the
fairly confident conclusion that, if creditor remedies do not satisfy state action
principles developed in racial discrimination cases, state action will not be found.
Id. at 1040-41.
'9 Note, State Action and the Constitutionality of UCC § 9-503, 30 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 547,
563 (1973). Once a lien had been effected, either the innkeeper or the guest could choose to
resort to the courts of the state. An innkeeper who failed to recover the uncollected debt
owing on the accommodations provided to the guest could seek to obtain a deficiency
judgment, or a guest who felt that the innkeeper's lien was unjustified could seek to sue the
innkeeper for recovery of the property or for money damages in an action for conversion.Id.
40 33 N.Y.2d at 20, 300 N.E.2d at 714, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 175 (footnote omitted): "[The
innkeeper's] actions are clothed with the authority of State law and their actions may be said to
be those of the State for purposes of the due process clauses."
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one authorized solely by statute, would be state action.41 Yet because
the innkeeper's lien parallels the common-law doctrine in almost all
respects, a significant question arises as to whether a private party's
acts, pursuant to the common law, can constitute state action.
In Adams v. Southern California First National Bank, 42 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a reposses-
sion pursuant to the common law, prior to adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code, was neither state action nor accomplished under
color of state law: 43
[M]erely enacting into statutory form what had been the accepted
practice for years, and a limited involvement that may be sufficient
for racial cases, does not command a finding of "state action"
[within the meaning of the civil rights statute] in an economic due
process case.44
An analogous argument applied to the innkeeper's lien would result
in a rejection ofBlye's underlying thesis that the statutory enactment
41 The issue of state action never arose in Sniadach or Fuentes because in each case the
deprivation was accomplished by the state agents. However,
[tjhe mere fact that the state has historically seized property in the enforcement of
remedies such as replevin, garnishment and attachment cannot serve to establish that
private conduct which resembles what the state has done in these other contexts is
thereby converted into a "state function."
Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay On the Fourteenth
Amendment (pt. III), 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 50 (1973).
42 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974). In support of its
decision, the court cited Fuentes, which had intimated that self-help did not involve state
action. Id. at 338; see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 79 n.12 (1972).
43 Several federal courts have determined that no state action is present when a secured
creditor repossesses goods without resort to judicial process as authorized by § 9-503 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, and have dismissed due process challenges to the constitutionality
of such self-help repossessions. See, e.g., Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 934 (1975); Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974); Brantley
v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974); Nichols
v. Tower Grove Bank, 497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1974); Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust
Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1001 (1974); Nowlin v. Professional
Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); James v. Pinnix, 495
F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank of Conn., 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974); Bichel Optical Laboratories, Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank of
Minneapolis, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973).
Although a distinction could be drawn between a repossessing creditor who had previ-
ously owned the secured property outright and an innkeeper who never had any ownership
rights over the property of the guest, other considerations provide equally compelling jus-
tification for the innkeeper's right to a lien. An innkeeper has rendered food and lodging, and
because these items have been "consumed" by the guest, they cannot possibly be subject to
repossession. Consequently, the innkeeper should have a right to substitute other property
belonging to the guest as compensation for the no-longer tangible property that was originally
the exclusive possession of the innkeeper and subsequently "transferred" to the guest.
44 492 F.2d at 333 n.24, citing Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir.
1973).
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of the lien law established a policy sufficient to support a finding of
state action, while a long-standing common-law tradition did not.45
If codification in a statute had evinced a sufficient change of policy
or other adequate "encouragement" to support a finding of state
action, the result in Blye might have had some merit. But the en-
couragement existed only in the limited sense that the presence of
the statute reduced the "risks" to the innkeeper. By statute, the
innkeeper was expressly clothed with authority of the law in execut-
ing the lien, and there was no "risk" of liability so long as he
complied with its terms. Prior to codification of the innkeeper's lien,
however, the innkeeper acted pursuant to common law. There thus
existed the possibility that if the state did not adopt the common law
in its entirety or if the courts would apply it in only limited circum-
stances, the innkeeper would incur a greater risk by executing a lien
without any foreknowledge of whether he might be exceeding his
prerogative. Despite the presence of a statute, such a self-help rem-
edy is actually "encouraged more by economic considerations than
by anything else."'46
4' See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 527 F.2d
150 (7th Cir. 1975); Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975).
In Davis, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the distraint of a lodger's property
pursuant to a Massachusetts boardinghouse lien statute did not involve state action to a
degree sufficient to violate the fourteenth amendment:
Merely because a state "legalizes" something does not necessarily signal that the state
itself has become a participant .... The "impetus" for any given distraint remains
wholly private.
Id. at 204.
In Moose Lodge, a liquor license was granted by the state to a private club that discrimi-
nated on the basis of race, and inJackson, a public utility terminated electric service to a private
citizen without notice or hearing for nonpayment of bills. Both cases involved the state to the
extent that liquor licensing and public utilities were activities regulated by the state. Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court found that there was insufficient state involvement in either case to
constitute a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Under the rationale of these cases, a
statute granting a private hotel proprietor the privilege of executing a lien on a guest's
property in a privately owned establishment should not be considered state action. The fact
that the innkeeper's exercise of the lien is not regulated in any way by state law and that the
innkeeper does not necessarily use the lien device when a guest defaults manifests an even
smaller degree of state involvement than in Moose Lodge and Jackson.
InAnastasia, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the actions of hotel proprietors
in executing liens because the "degree of involvement [by the state fell] short of the significant
degree of encouragement or affirmative support necessary to the existence of state action."
527 F.2d at 156. Thus, the conduct of the defendant hotels was not taken under "color of
law" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
46 Kirksey v. Theiig, 351 F. Supp. 727,731 n.8 (D. Colo. 1972). In Kirksey, the question of
state involvement or encouragement in self-help repossessions pursuant to statute was ad-
dressed by the court in the following manner:
We would be less than candid if we did not note that the private activity can be
interpreted as being encouraged by the statutes. But encouragement exists only in
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Aside from the "encouragement" or state-sanction theory, the
courts have employed a "public-function" doctrine as a basis for
finding state action.47 An individual is considered to be acting "un-
der color of state law" if he performs a function traditionally exer-
cised by the state or if he acts as an agent of the state.48 InBlye, the
court perfunctorily assumed that the innkeeper was performing a
traditionally public function thereby attributing such action to the
state for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. 49 But it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court would consider the innkeeper's lien to be a
traditionally public function since the right of the innkeeper to
execute a lien upon default in payment by the guest has been
recognized for centuries and would thereby constitute private ac-
tion. 50 Furthermore, several courts have held that state enforcement
procedures, applied neutrally, do not intrinsically give rise to state
action. 5 1 State laws of a permissive character that merely authorize
the very limited sense that under the statutes the secured parties have less risk in
making the repossessions than they would if there were no statutes or case law on the
subject. ... The self-help repossessions are really encouraged more by economic
considerations than by anything else.
Id.
"I See Comment, UCC § 9-503--Repossession, 50 DENVER L.J. 261, 267 (1973).
48 The court in Blye justified a finding of state action in the following manner:
In this State, the execution of a lien, be it a conventional security interest, a writ
of attachment, or a judgment lien traditionally has been the function of the Sheriff.
On this view, "State action" can be found in an innkeeper's execution on his own lien.
33 N.Y.2d at 20,300 N.E.2d at 713-14, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 175 (citations omitted). The analogy
between an innkeeper's lien and other liens is not particularly relevant in the context of state
action because, in fact, execution of the innkeeper's lien has never been a traditional function
of any officer of the state. From its inception in Medieval England and continuing through to
the present time, exercise of the lien has always been considered a function exclusively
reserved to the innkeeper. In contrast to other forms of prejudgment seizure, the impact of
the innkeeper's lien would be diminished if the innkeeper were not permitted immediately to
employ this private remedy to prevent a defaulting guest from escaping with his baggage.
49 The Blye court cited Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970), a California
case invalidating the innkeeper's lien, as authority for this proposition. 33 N.Y.2d at 20, 300
N.E.2d at 714, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 175. In finding state action, the court in Klim relied primarily
on the Supreme Court decision of Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). Klim interpreted
Reitman as standing for the proposition that private conduct was state action if that conduct
was "encouraged" by the state. The Klim court remarked that "the only state involvement at all
[in Reitman] was the enactment of the statute in question by the California legislature." 315 F.
Supp. at 114. However, because it failed to recognize that "Reitman involved a constitutional
amendment-not a statute-which effectively foreclosed the ability of minority groups to
obtain fair housing legislation through ordinary political channels," the district court in Klim
misconstrued the case. Burke & Reber, pra note 41, at 51. For a more complete discussion of
this point, see Burke & Reber, supra note 38, at 1074-82.
" See Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975).
51 The state cannot assist or facilitate in any manner discriminatory actions undertaken
by a private party. See, e.g., Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964) (state arrest and
prosecution of blacks for entering privately owned amusement park with racially restrictive
admission policy); Adams v. Southern Calif. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 337 (9th Cir.
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private conduct, and therefore only indirectly encourage such con-
duct, do not satisfy the fourteenth amendment's state-action re-
quirement.5 2 Because state law has an authoritative impact upon
almost every form of private conduct, 53 all such conduct would thus
be subjected to these constitutional restraints under the Blye ratio-
nale. Yet the fourteenth amendment was designed to extend no
further than protecting a citizen from arbitrary and capricious ac-
tion by the state.5 4
I
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CONCEPTS APPLIED
TO THE INNKEEPER'S LIEN
In view of the unique relationship between the innkeeper and
his guest, it is evident that, in order to prevent the guest from
defrauding the innkeeper, the practical effectiveness of a lien is
dependent upon the innkeeper's right to seize immediately property
in the possession of a guest prior to a hearing. Several recent court
decisions, 55 however, construing the safeguards required by the
1973) (collecting cases); Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973) (state approval of
Federal Housing Administration mortgage benefits and rent supplements received by land-
lord, combined with use of state eviction procedures, constituting state action).
52 Adams v. Southern Calif. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974) (footnotes omitted):
The test is not state involvement, but rather is significant state involvement.
Statutes and laws regulate many forms of purely private activity, such as contractual
relations and gifts; and subjecting all behavior that conforms to state law to the
Fourteenth Amendment would emasculate the state action concept.
See also Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1974). In Bond, the plaintiffs executed wage
assignments as security for loans but subsequently defaulted. Although the loan companies
were licensed under the New York Banking Law to engage in the business of making small
loans, the court held that the lenders' action in filing wage assignments with the borrowers'
employers did not constitute state action. The state was not a partner of the lenders, the intent
of the wage assignment statute was not to encourage wage assignments, and the statute did not
vest lenders with a function traditionally performed by the state. The court employed lan-
guage used in Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739,744 (2d Cir. 1974), a case that involved
a Connecticut codification of the common-law right of self-help repossession in conditional
sales transactions: "Codification did not encourage the practice one whit. As we have pointed
out, the legislaition made it less attractive by providing greater safeguards .... Id. at 310.
'3 For example, in Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1973), the
court held:
It is difficult to imagine any statutory provision that does not, in some way, control
human relationships. To say... that all human behavior which conforms to statutory
requirements is "State action" or is "under color of State law" would far exceed not
only what the framers of the Civil Rights Act ever intended but common sense as
well.
See also Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118, 121 (D. Neb. 1972).
:4 See generally Burke & Reber, supra note 38, at 1012.
' See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell
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fourteenth amendment's due process clause, have held that a person
must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before he may
be deprived of his property. 56 Following this approach, the Supreme
Court in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 57 struck down a Wisconsin
statute that permitted prejudgment wage garnishment.58 In refining
this concept of a deprivation of property, the Court in Fuentes v.
Shevin"9 emphasized that the opportunity for a prior hearing was a
constitutional requirement that did not depend upon the particular
type of summary remedy sought, 60 the nature of the property in-
volved, 61 or the duration or severity of the deprivation. 2
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Sniadach, carefully
noted that not every interference with or restraint upon an owner's
assets prior to judgment constituted a deprivation of property
within the meaning of the due process clause. 63 It was pointed out
that "[s]uch summary procedure may well meet the requirements of
due process in extraordinary situations." '64 Furthermore, the Court
in Sniadach seemed to indicate a presumption in favor of the con-
stitutionality of attachment and garnishment from which it was
carving a rather limited exception when there was no adequate
v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
" Past attempts to reconcile the requisites of procedural due process with prejudgment
attachment procedures resulted in a determination that such detention of a person's property
was merely deprivation of the possessioh or use and not a defeasance of the title. See, e.g., Byrd
v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932); Mclnnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699
(1928); Brown Shoe Co. v. Hunt, 103 Iowa 586, 72 N.W. 765 (1897).
57 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See note 16 supra.
58 The Supreme Court held that absent certain special circumstances that would justify a
summary procedure, a person must be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard before
his wages could be garnished. 395 U.S. at 339.
59 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See note 17 supra.
60 407 U.S. at 81-82.
61 Id. at 88-90.
62 Id. at 86.
63 395 U.S. at 340.
A procedural rule that may satisfy due process for attachments in general...
does not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case .... We deal here
with wages-a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our
economic system.
Id. (emphasis added).
64 Id. at 339. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text infra. Prejudgment seizure has been
permitted in the following situations: Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594
(1950) (to protect the public from misbranded drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947)
(Federal Home Loan Bank's appointment of conservator to take charge of the affairs of loan
association); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (summary seizure of property to
collect revenue for the United States); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (execution
upon failing bank's shareholders by a State Superintendent of Banks to protect interests of
depositors); United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S: 547 (1921) (to meet the needs of a national war
effort).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
showing of a countervailing "state or creditor interest. '65 Arguably,
the innkeeper has such a "creditor interest."
Although the lien today is generally statutory, the courts in this
country have continued to place certain special duties, embodied in
the common law, upon the innkeeper. The first of these duties is the
requirement that all travelers be accepted who properly apply to be
admitted as guests. 66 Proprietors of strictly private business enter-
prises are under no such obligation, enjoying an absolute right to
serve whom they please under common-law and state statutory
provisions. 67 The innkeeper's second principal duty is to receive all
possessions accompanying the guest, as long as they properly qualify
as baggage. 68 Liability is imposed upon the innkeeper for loss of the
guest's baggage or property and this liability can be limited only by
state statutory enactment. In view of these responsibilities, there
appears to be justification for according the innkeeper a lien as an
avenue of recourse against a defaulting guest. 69 This is especially
true when one considers the unusual creditor interest of the inn-
keeper. Space and service are being rendered to the guest; neither
can be recaptured in the sense that a creditor of consumer items can
repossess the products that he has sold. The innkeeper's "com-
modities" are therefore intangibles, for which he can only be com-
pensated by monetary payment or by seizing the property of the
guest.
6- 395 U.S. at 339.But see Klim v.Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970). In its refusal
to recognize any overriding creditor interest, the Klim court failed to distinguish such an
interest in the vendor-creditor context from that in the innkeeper-guest relationship. Id. at
121.
66 "When the hotel opens its doors to the general public, in the eyes of the law its owner
sends out an invitation to the public." J. SHERRY, HOW TO EXCLUDE AND EJECT UNDESIRABLE
GuEsTs 3 (1943). See also Willis v. McMahan, 89 Cal. 156, 26 P. 649 (1891).
In New York, the refusal of an innkeeper, without just cause or excuse, to receive and
entertain a guest (an indictable offense at common law) has been made a misdemeanor. N.Y.
Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 4 0-e (McKinney Supp. 1975), which provides:
A person, who, either on his own account or as agent or officer of a corporation,
carries on business as innkeeper, or as common carrier of passengers, and refuses,
without just cause or excuse, to receive and entertain any guest, or to receive and
carry any passenger, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
6'7 In Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697, cert. denied,
332 U.S. 761 (1947), the New York Court of Appeals concluded that places of amusement and
resort, unlike inns or common carriers engaged in a public calling, enjoy an absolute power to
exclude anyone, subject to the legislative restriction of N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40 (McKinney
1948) that no one may he excluded on the basis of his race, creed, color, or national origin. See
also Sherry, supra note 29.
6 See notes 5 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
69 Bonner v. Welborn, 7 Ga. 296, 307 (1849): "And it is because of the compulsion
innkeepers are under, to afford entertainment to any body [sic], that the law has clothed them
with extraordinary privileges." See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
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The Court in Fuentes, as it had done in Sniadach, noted that in
certain extraordinary circumstances statutes need not provide for a
hearing prior to the taking of property. 70 The Court defined these
extraordinary situations to include those involving a "public inter-
est," or "special situations demanding prompt action."'7 1 The inn-
keeper's situation certainly meets this test because quick and decisive
action is necessary to place a lien upon the property of a guest before
the latter can remove his baggage. 72 This argument was articulated
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Smith v. Colcord:73
[A] guest who had obtained credit upon the strength of the lien,
might destroy the security... by a sale or by removing the goods,
at any time before the bill for board became payable by the
contract; a result which is inconsistent with the nature of the lien
74
In essence, the law has clothdd the innkeeper with the power of the
lien as a device commensurate with the extent of his extraordinary
responsibilities.
The Court in Sniadach and Fuentes also indicated that an ex-
traordinary situation sufficient to warrant postponement of a hear-
ing may exist when there is a necessity of using prejudgment sei-
zures to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction over the property of the
debtor. 75 In Fuentes the Court referred to this factor as "dearly a
70 407 U.S. at 93. One extraordinary situation permitting summary seizures arises where
the disputed goods may be concealed or destroyed by a debtor. The difficulty in using this
criterion as a justification for the lien is that the meaning of the words "disputed goods" is
ambiguous. These words may impose no limitation at all so that goods involved in any dispute
may be taken summarily in special situations demanding prompt action; or conceivably,
summary seizure may be allowed only where a dispute between the creditor and debtor arises
as to the right to possess the goods that are sought to be taken. Under this interpretation,
Fuentes may confine the "special situations demanding prompt action" to those cases in which a
secured party seeks to repossess the collateral to which his security interest has attached. See
Hawkland, The Seed of Sniadach: Flower or Weed?, 78 CoM. L.J. 246, 250-51 (1973).
71 407 U.S. at 91-93.
72 Under these circumstances, notice and opportunity for a hearing may lawfully be
postponed until after seizure as "a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger that a
debtor will destroy or conceal disputed goods." Id. at 93.
73 115 Mass. 70 (1874). This case involved a boardinghouse keeper's statutory lien, but
the reaso'ing would apply equally to the common-law lien of an innkeeper.
74 Id. at 71.
71 In discussing extraordinary situations, both Sniadach and Fuentes cited Ownbey v.
Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), which sustained the constitutionality of Delaware's foreign
attachment statute even though the statute permitted the property of the defendant to be
taken prior to a hearing and denied the defendant the right to defend unless he first posted
security in the amount of the value of the goods attached. Justice Douglas's reliance on Ownbey
and his allusion in Sniadach to the fact that "in personam jurisdiction was readily obtainable" in
that case (395 U.S. at 339) suggests that this is one situation requiring special protection to a
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most basic and important public interest,"76 and even the presence
of a liberal long-arm statute would not dilute the significance of
that interest. In relation to the innkeeper's situation, a transient
guest might leave a false address or name with the innkeeper or
otherwise be constantly moving about, making service of process
difficult if not impossible. In addition, if the innkeeper were re-
quired to institute a hearing prior to the seizure of a guest's goods,
the guest might easily circumvent the proceedings by taking his
property and leaving the jurisdiction prior to the hearing. There is
nothing to prevent his quick departure since the guest is, by defini-
tion, a transient.77 By permitting the innkeeper to take possession of
a guest's property prior to notice and hearing, jurisdiction may be
conferred upon the court such that a quasi in remjudgment against
the property detained will at least partially satisfy the amount owed
to the innkeeper if an in personam judgment is unavailable.
For the above reasons, the innkeeper has a greater need to
detain his guest's property without a prior hearing than a vendor-
creditor has to detain the property of a debtor.7 8 The Blye opinion,
in fact, concedes that a state's summary seizure of a person's prop-
erty may be permissible under the due process clause when the need
for prompt action is paramount.7 9 Logic would therefore dictate
that the rationale of Sniadach and Fuentes not be extended to the area
of the innkeeper's lien. The creditor's interest in this context is
dearly paramount, 0 and the innkeeper also has a legitimate claim to
due process of law in the protection and collection of what is owed
him for services rendered.
state or creditor interest, and thereby justifies the constitutional use of a summary procedure
when in personam jurisdiction is not readily obtainable.
Because a nonresident guest is more likely to be willing and able to transfer his goods
outside the state, the hotel-creditor's need to retain the innkeeper's lien may be greater when
the debtor is a nonresident than when he is a resident. A default judgment rendered against
the guest may be uncollectible if he is beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, it is
generally agreed that states have a valid creditor interest in affording residents access to their
courts to prosecute claims against nonresidents. See, e.g., Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance
Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335, 1348-49 (E.D. Pa. 1971), affd, 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1049 (1972).
76 407 U.S. at 91 n.23.
77 See note 2 supra.
78 See Note, The Innkeeper's Lien and Due Process-Klim v. Jones, 5 U. RICH. L. REv. 447,
452-53 (1971).
79 33 N.Y.2d at 21, 300 N.E.2d at 714, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
80 In the majority of garnishment actions the debtor is permanently settled within the
jurisdiction of the court, as the wage-earner was in Sniadach. Under these circumstances, the
employee-debtor is not likely to quit his job, pack up, and leave the jurisdiction in order to
avoid a garnishment proceeding. Thus, postjudgment garnishment would be an effective
substitute for the prejudgment garnishment of wages held unconstitutional in Sniadach.
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In the recent Supreme Court case of Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. 81
sequestration of household appliances was upheld against an attack
based upon Fuentes when the seizure was used to enforce a claim
against a customer. The lower courts and the Supreme Court re-
fused to vacate the order of sequestration and rejected the claim by
the defaulting purchaser that the seizure violated his due process
rights to notice and a prior hearing.
In holding that the sequestration in Mitchell satisfied the stric-
tures of the fourteenth amendment, the Court in effect retreated
from the broad principles enunciated in Fuentes. The concurring
opinion of Justice Powell affirmatively expressed the view that the
application of Fuentes to prejudgment seizure cases was no longer
subject to a liberal interpretation: 82 "The Court's decision today
withdraws significantly from the full reach of that principle, and to
this extent I think it fair to say that the Fuentes opinion is over-
ruled. '83 In emphasizing the similarities between the sequestration
and replevin procedures, the dissenting opinion also confirmed this
view. 84 The Court, however, did not expressly overrule Fuentes;
rather, the majority opinion attempted to distinguish sequestration
from replevin by noting the additional "safeguards" contained in the
former action. 85
81 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
82 Mr. Justice Powell stated in his concurring opinion that
[i]t seems to me... that it was unnecessary for theFuentes opinion to have adopted so
broad and inflexible a rule, especially one that considerably altered settled law with
respect to commercial transactions and basic creditor-debtor understandings.
416 U.S. at 624.
Several New York cases have followed the Supreme Court's rationale in Mitchell. See In re
Jerry v. Board of Education of Syracuse, 35 N.Y.2d 534, 324 N.E.2d 106, 364 N.Y.S.2d 440
(1974) (suspension of tenured teacher without pay pending final determination of disciplinary
proceedings pursuant to properly worded state statute does not infringe upon teacher's
constitutional rights so long as such determination is not unreasonably delayed);In re Sanford
v. Rockefeller, 35 N.Y.2d 547, 324 N.E.2d 113, 364 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1974) (due process
afforded in disciplining of public employees, charged with having engaged in a strike contrary
to injunctive provisions of a state statute, by summarily imposing upon them a fine and a one
year probationary status with the right thereafter to file objections); Hunt v. Marine Midland
Bank-Central, 80 Misc. 2d 329, 363 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1974) (citing Mitchell in support of the
proposition that the interests of both the buyer and seller of property should be taken into
account in deciding due process questions); Jones v. Banner Moving & Storage, Inc., 78 Misc.
2d 762, 773-75, 358 N.Y.S.2d 885, 898-99 (1974) (maintaining that the Mitchell safeguards,
though not present in Banner, comport with due process).
83 416 U.S. at 623.
84 Id at 629-34. In both actions the creditor claiming an interest in goods was permitted
to seize them without giving any prior notice to the debtor or presenting him with a prior
opportunity to rebut the allegations of the vendor. The creditor was merely required to file a
complaint and an affidavit generally alleging his purported entitlement to the goods in order
to procure the issuance of a writ and seizure of the goods.
85 Id at 615-18. These safeguards included conserving the property of the debtor
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The divergent views expressed by the majority and the dissent
clearly illustrate that the requirements of due process may vary
according to one's perception of the adequacy of available pro-
cedural safeguards other than prior notice and hearing, and accord-
ing to the manner in which the interests of the parties are defined.
The additional safeguards protecting the debtor under the seques-
tration statute involved in Mitchell are comparable in degree to
those protective measures that effectively balance the interests of the
innkeeper and the guest. As a practical matter, because the guest
is frequently unaware that payment is due, the innkeeper wants to
give the guest notice of this fact before resorting to the poten-
tially unnecessary procedure of exercising the lien. An innkeeper
holding a lien on goods is also under a legal obligation to take
reasonable care of such goods. In addition, where several people
constitute a single party but only one is responsible for payment of
the bill, only the property that actually or ostensibly belongs to the
responsible party can be held on lien for the charges. 86 Finally, most
states have enacted statutes authorizing the sale by innkeepers of
property held under the lien only upon strict compliance with statu-
tory procedures. 87
The most recent Supreme Court opinion on the constitutional-
ity of prejudgment remedies is North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc. 88 In striking down a Georgia prejudgment garnishment
pending judgment (as compared to giving the property outright to the creditor under the
replevin procedures formerly considered by the Supreme Court), requiring a judge to pass
upon the ex parte application (as compared to automatic issuance by a court clerk under the
replevin procedure), and requiring the applicant to make a "convincing" showing, rather than
a bare assertion of entitlement to the goods. See text accompanying note 101 infra.
86 J. SHERRY, THE LAWS OF INNKEEPERS 451 (1972).
87 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 207-09 (McKinney 1968). In New York, before an
innkeeper can make a sale of such property, he must prepare a notice of sale and publish it in
a local newspaper at least 15 days prior to the date of sale. He is also under a duty to send a
copy of the notice of sale to each person whose property is put up for sale at the address
appearing on the records of the hotel. Id. The procedures set forth in the statute must be
strictly followed; failure to do so will expose the innkeeper to liability for damages to a guest
returning at some future date, making claim for the property, and offering to pay the charges.
Dajkovich v. Hotel Waldorf Astoria Corp., 285 App. Div. 421, 137 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1955), aff'd,
309 N.Y. 1005, 133 N.E.2d 456 (1956).
88 419 U.S. 601 (1975). In North Georgia Finishing, the plaintiff corporation instituted a
suit against the defendant corporation on an alleged indebtedness for goods sold and deliv-
ered. Simultaneously and pursuant to Georgia statute, the plaintiff filed an affidavit and bond
with the court's clerk for process of garnishment upon the defendant's bank. The defendant
thereafter filed a counterbond with the court's clerk resulting in the, discharge of the bank as
garnishee. As the bank account was no longer frozen by the writ, the defendant's motion to
dismiss was thus directed toward the release of its bond. In reversing the Supreme Court of
Georgia, the United States Supreme Court held that the garnishment procedure lacked
sufficient due process safeguards as required by the fourteenth amendment.
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statute,8 9 the Court continued to employ the flexible due process
analysis developed in Mitchell.90 Writing for the majority, Justice
White stated that the statutes in Fuentes and North Georgia were
unconstitutional "[b]ecause the official seizures had been carried out
without notice and without opportunity for a hearing or other
safeguard against mistaken repossession." 91 Conspicuously absent
from this language are the words "prior notice" and "prior oppor-
tunity." It is therefore clear that "[b]y stopping short of an absolute
proscription against seizures not preceded by notice and hearing, '92
the standard for due process set forth by Justice White is weaker
than that established in Fuentes. Thus, one impact of the Mitchell and
North Georgia cases would seem to be that in the area of creditor
remedies a prior hearing is unnecessary when other standards
sufficiently protect the interest of the debtor.93
In view of the Supreme Court's trend toward a more flexible
approach to the concept of procedural due process, it is reasonable
to conclude that the "exceptional circumstances" test articulated in
Sniadach-Fuentes94 still survives the Court's analysis in North Georgia
Finishing. 95 A paramount creditor interest has been recognized by
89 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-101, -102. -401 (1974). In permitting issuance of a writ of
garnishment, the Georgia statutes did not require authorization by a judge, an affidavit
containing statements of fact as opposed to mere conclusory allegations, nor did the statute
provide for a prompt postseizure hearing.
90 This analysis involves an examination of various procedural safeguards that might
justify a postseizure hearing, rather than strict adherence to the prior notice and hearing
requirements of Fuentes.
In a practical sense, the shift to a balancing test [i.e., a flexible analysis] means that
counsel for an individual who has been deprived of a property interest by summary
seizure can no longer unequivocally assert that due process mandates opportunity for
a prior hearing.
28 VAND. L. REv. 908, 918-19 (1975).
This position was highlighted in Mitchell, wherein the Court stated that "[tihe require-
ments of due process of law 'are not technical, nor is any particular form of procedure
necessary.'" 416 U.S. at 610, quoting Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 710
(1945). See also Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961): "The very nature of
due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every
imaginable situation ...."
91 419 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added). The reference to "other safeguards" indicates an
attempt by the Court to reconcile Fuentes with Mitchell, as the latter case embodied other
procedural safeguards which did not include the notice and hearing requirements expressed
in Fuentes.
92 See Note, The Evolving Definition of Procedural Due Process in Debtor-Creditor Relations:
From Sniadach to North Georgia Finishing, 8 LoYorA or L.A. L. REv. 339, 357 (1975).
" See notes 123-29 and accompanying text infra.
94 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
95 Although Sniadach and Fuentes had mandated a strict requirement of prior notice and
hearing in order to survive constitutional attack, the Court nonetheless created exceptions
where the circumstances indicated an emergency situation or a paramount creditor interest.
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the Court as an exceptional circumstance, 96 and as pointed out
earlier in this Note, the innkeeper's interest in the collection of his
debt should outweigh any countervailing interest of the guest. 97
Although the innkeeper's interest falls within the purview of the
"exceptional circumstances" test, it is clear that the innkeeper's lien
statutes could not presently survive constitutional attack since there
are no provisions for a prompt hearing subsequent to seizure of the
guest's baggage. 98 In Mitchell, the Court pointed out that unlike the
replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania examined in Fuentes,
Louisiana's sequestration procedure provided for an immediate
hearing, and dissolution of the writ unless the plaintiff "proves the
grounds upon which the writ was issued." 99 North Georgia also indi-
cates that the constitutional adequacy of a creditor statute depends
upon an express provision for an early hearing. 100 In light of these
decisions, the innkeeper's lien law of every state will; at a minimum,
have to be modified to the extent of incorporating a definite provi-
sion for hearings.
IV
INNKEEPER'S LIEN STATUTE CONFORMING WITH
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
Assuming arguendo that the innkeeper-guest relationship does
not constitute an exceptional circumstance that would exempt the
innkeeper's actions from prior notice and hearing requirements, it is
necessary, in light of Mitchell and North Georgia, to determine what
criteria must be embodied within an innkeeper's lien statute to
Mitchell and North Georgia relaxed these procedural due process requirements but left intact
the Court's prior "exceptional-circumstances" test. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), wherein the Court returned to the Fuentes "extraordinary-
situation" test one week after the announcement of the Mitchell decision. See 60 CORNELL L.
Rv. 467, 483-84 (1975), for a discussion of the Court's rationale in applying this test to
Pearson.
'6 See notes 64-77 and accompanying text supra.
97 Statements by justice Powell in his concurring opinion in North Georgia lend support to
this proposition:
I continue to doubt whetherFuentes strikes a proper balance, especially in cases where
the creditor's interest in the property may be as significant or even greater than that
of the debtor.
... The State's legitimate interest in facilitating creditor recovery through the
provision of garnishment remedies has never been seriously questioned.
419 U.S. at 609-10.
9 See notes 26-27 supra.
99 416 U.S. at 606.
100 419 U.S. at 607-08.
[Vol. 61:587
INNKEEPER'S LIEN
survive constitutional attack. In distinguishing the replevin statutes
in Fuentes from the Louisiana sequestration procedure, the Court in
Mitchell specified five separate safeguards embodied in the Louisiana
statute. 011 Briefly stated, the creditor is required to file an affidavit
alleging specific facts as opposed to mere conclusory statements,
there must be authorization by a judge rather than a court clerk as a
condition precedent to issuance of the writ, an attaching creditor is
required to post bond and a debtor can regain possession by posting
a counterbond, and finally, the statute must provide a definite op-
portunity for an early hearing at which the plaintiff must prove the
existence of the debt.
North Georgia found three of the five criteria lacking in the
Georgia statute and therefore struck down the garnishment proce-
dure as unconstitutional.' 0 2 It is still unclear whether the Court
would require, in similar creditor cases where notice and a hearing
are absent, a mechanical application of Mitchell resulting in a quan-
titative rather than a qualitative approach in determining the protec-
tion that must be afforded the debtor.103 It is possible, for example,
that the Georgia procedure would have been upheld by the court
had it included three factors similar to those approved in Mitchell;
but because North Georgia was not decided against a factual back-
ground involving the absence of only one of the Mitchell criteria, it is
open to question whether the Court would view the test evolving
from Mitchell as one requiring strict compliance. 10 4
101 416 U.S. at 605-10.
102 See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
103 The lower court cases following Mitchell indicate that the relative importance of these
procedural safeguards is still unresolved. An attachment procedure in Tennessee was upheld
as constitutional despite the absence of two safeguards present in Mitchell (no debtor counter-
bond or immediate postseizure hearing). Woods v. Tennessee, 378 F. Supp. 1364 (W.D. Tenn.
1974). See also Guzman v. Western State Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1262 (D.N.D. 1974), wherein the
absence of a provision for judicial supervision was not held fatal to the constitutionality of a
North Dakota replevin statute. On the other hand, a narrow reading of Mitchell would require
strict compliance with all five criteria. See, e.g., Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co., 377 F. Supp.
1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), wherein the court struck down an attachment statute which met all
Mitchell criteria except the one requiring an early postseizure hearing. For cases following the
approach employed in North Georgia, where the challenged statute was compared to the
Fuentes and Mitchell statutes, see Garner v. Tri-State Development Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D.
Mich. 1974) (mortgage foreclosure statute invalidated due to absence of provision of pre- or
postseizure hearing); Manning v. Palmer, 381 F. Supp. 713 (D. Ariz. 1974) (Arizona garnish-
ment and attachment statutes that did not provide for prior notice and opportunity to be
heard held violative of due process); Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974)
(Texas sequestration statutes denied procedural due process in failing to provide judicial
supervision of issuance of the writ and an immediate postseizure hearing).
104 The dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun (with concurrence by Justice Rehnquist)
in North Georgia indicates the confusing state of affairs emanating from this decision:
[I] venture to suggest that we would not be immersed in confusion, with Fuentes one
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In examining these five criteria as they relate to the innkeeper-
guest relationship, it is evident from Mitchell and North Georgia that
the procedural safeguard mandating an- immediate postseizure
hearing would have to be embodied in an innkeeper's lien statute. 10 5
The other four safeguards enumerated in Mitchell would not be
relevant in the context of an innkeeper's lien. The two safeguards
that involve issuance of provisional writs' 06 would have the effect of
emasculating the lien because the innkeeper would be unable to
exercise the lien immediately if he were first required to file an
affidavit before a judicial officer. 10 7 Processing provisional writs
would also create an overwhelming amount of legal work for the
courts in addition to imposing an impractical burden upon the
innkeeper, who would be constantly running to the courts to obtain
a writ.' 0 8 Such writs would rob the lien law of any substance; for the
ability of the innkeeper to execute the lien immediately gives it
strength and provides for flexibility of action. The other two pro-
cedural due process safeguards involving bond requirements would
not only have a detrimental effect upon the interests of the inn-
keeper, but would also be of little beneficial value to a guest. Posting
a surety bond, which "indemnifies" the guest against any damages
he might suffer because of wrongful use of the writ, would not give
any real protection to the guest. The requirement would not dis-
courage the filing of frivolous claims by innkeepers because the cost
of such a bond would in many cases be negligible; 0 9 dearly, a bond
way, Mitchell another, and now this case decided in a manner that leaves counsel and
the commercial communities in other States uncertain as to whether their own
established and long-accepted statutes pass constitutional muster with a wavering
tribunal off in Washington, D.C.
419 U.S. at 619.
105 See notes 98-100 and accompanying text supra.
106 A provisional writ is a protective device which enables the innkeeper to have the
property temporarily detained prior to ajudgment on the merits of the controversy. It assures
the plaintiff in a civil action that the property will not be dissipated while action is pending.
107 See notes 72-74 and accompanying text supra.
108 See Note, supra note 90, at 919:
Factual affidavits may serve to deter the filing of fraudulent or spurious affidavits,
but the deterrence is lost if the affiant is not promptly put to his proof. Properly
administered, the post-seizure hearing may be the most effective device to prevent
injustice ....
109 At least one state, South Carolina, requires in the case of attachment that the "reten-
tion" bond for the defaulting party be double that of the amount claimed by the creditor. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 10-931 (1962). A research project in Florida disclosed that although a replevin
creditor could post a bond for as little as 1% 0fits total cost, the current market rate for a bond
for the debtor was likely to be the full value of the property. See Abbott & Peters, Fuentes v.
Shevin: A Narrative of Federal Test Litigation in the Legal Services Program, 57 IowA L. Ry. 955,
982 (1972). The United States Supreme Court has apparently never allowed the posting of a
surety bond to defeat a constitutional claim. See Kennedy, Due Process Limitations on Creditors'
Remedies: Some Reflections on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 19 AM. U.L. REV. 158, 180-81
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requirement would not discourage the innkeeper from exercising
the lien when he had a mistaken belief as to the facts or legal merits
of his claim. In addition, there are many guests who would not be
aided by such a provision because they lack the financial ability to
acquire a surety and therefore retain their possessions prior to a
hearing.
The recent array of Supreme Court decisions examining pro-
cedural due process concepts introduces an element of uncertainty
into the area of prejudgment seizures and compels a reassessment of
the innkeeper's lien. Examining the quality and efficacy of the vari-
ous safeguards found in a prejudgment statute, rather than the
quantity, would protect the guest's interest while also accommodat-
ing the creditor interest of the innkeeper.
" V
"ALTERNATIVES" TO THE INNKEEPER'S LIEN
Whether a guest may validly waive his constitutional rights by
contract, thereby rendering himself vulnerable to summary attach-
ment procedures, is central to any consideration of the due process
problems in the innkeeper's lien cases. Certain language in Fuentes
indicates that one may waive his constitutional right to notice and a
prior hearing if such waiver is made explicitly, voluntarily, and
knowingly.110 However, the availability and effectiveness of waivers
in the hotel industry is questionable."' The well-recognized pre-
sumption against the waiver of a constitutional right imposes a
(1970). The bonding requirements have recently been challenged on constitutional grounds as
a denial of equal protection. See, e.g., Sanks v. Georgia, 401 U.S. 144 (1971) (appeal dismissed
due to changed circumstances); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716,
724-25 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (issue not decided since replevin statute found unconstitutional on
other grounds). The Court in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), however, seems to have
robbed the bond requirement of any constitutional foundation:
The minimal deterrent effect of a bond requirement is, in a practical sense, no
substitute for an informed evaluation by a neutral official. More specifically, as a
matter of constitutional principle, it is no replacement for the right to a prior hearing
that is the only truly effective safeguard against arbitrary deprivation of property.
Id. at 83.
110 407 U.S. at 94-96, citing D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
11 The Blye court did not mention waiver or alternative procedures that might be
employed by the innkeeper to preserve his creditor interests. For a discussion of the "effec-
tiveness" of waivers, see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiver of sixth amendment
rights), and Fuentes in 407 U.S. at 94 (waiver provisions of conditional sales contract held
ineffective in permitting summary replevin). In the civil as well as the criminal area, "courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver." Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S.
389, 393 (1937). See also Cedar Rapids Eng'r Co. v. Haenelt, 39 App. Div. 2d 275, 277, 333
N.Y.S.2d 953, 956 (1972).
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"heavy burden" on the innkeeper seeking to use a waiver agreement
in the lien context. Furthermore, such a waiver must be "an inten-
tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
lege."' 12 A guest would probably be unaware of the existence of such
a provision in a contract, and in any event would not have a full
appreciation of its legal significance even if he were aware of it.13
Furthermore, whether a purported waiver was both knowing and
intentional would itself require judicial determination at an adver-
sary hearing before a guest's property could be expropriated." 4
Because the difficulty of demonstrating the validity of the
waiver could be greater than that involved in proving the validity of
the innkeeper's underlying claim, the practical effect of utilizing the
waiver device would be to dilute the lien law of all meaning; a waiver
found to be infirm would, in most situations, permanently deprive
the innkeeper of his security even if the underlying claim were, in
fact, legitimate. A guest may have defaulted in his payments thereby
entitling the innkeeper to exercise a lien in accordance with the
waiver agreement. Yet, if the waiver were executed improperly, the
guest would be allowed to regain possession of his property. The
guest would then be free to abscond with his baggage precluding
any subsequent hearing on the merits. It is also questionable
whether courts would allow themselves to be put in the onerous
position of supervising the "voluntariness" of the waiver in every
agreement. The burden on the innkeeper would be equally great as
the high turnover of guests in hotels would discourage any attempt
to ensure full compliance with the standards that support a waiver.
Finally, the innkeeper has a special creditor interest justifying sum-
mary seizure apart from reliance on the waiver.
The right of an innkeeper to require payment in advance for
the accommodation of a guest would also be ineffective as a practical
means of protecting the innkeeper. Although payment in advance
has been suggested as an alternative to the innkeeper's lien," 5 this
argument has also been rejected as impractical because of uncer-
tainty as to the anticipated length of the guest's stay and as contrary
to the convenience sought by travelers. 1 6 Demanding payment in
advance would be a time-consuming burden upon the innkeeper
and his guest who would be required not only to pay prior to each
112 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
113 Cf Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d
258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
114 Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349, 1359 (D. Del. 1971).
I's Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 124 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
116 Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 189 N.Y. 302, 321, 82 N.E. 143, 150 (1907).
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day's lodging but also to pay immediately for all meals and phone
calls. Many hotels view distastefully any such requirement since the
effect would be to intimidate the guest and possibly cause him to
seek accommodations elsewhere. Although payment in advance
could work to the advantage of all hotels, the competitive atmo-
sphere pervading the hotel industry 1 7 would inevitably lead to
certain inns disregarding the requirement, with the net effect of
abandonment of the policy by most hotels.
VI
ACCOMMODATING CREDITOR AND DEBTOR INTERESTS
THROUGH A NARROWLY DRAWN STATUTE
The development of the innkeeper's lien at common law has
been essentially a process of equating the interests of the innkeeper
with those of the guest-property owner, while at the same time
accommodating the requirements of a changing and expanding
society." 8 The detention of property without notice and hearing has
been held to violate procedural due process; but the right of the
innkeeper to compensation for services rendered to his guest is at
least equally compelling. Hence, even if presently enacted inn-
keeper's lien statutes are not able to survive judicial scrutiny, a
narrowly drawn statute (one that would protect the innkeeper's
overriding interests while securing certain basic rights for his guest)
should survive constitutional attack." 9
Any proposal to change the lien law requires an examination of
modern exigencies because certain of the conditions that existed
when the lien was born have changed. The hazardous traveling
conditions prevalent in earlier times have disappeared 120 with the
result that the innkeeper is now less of a guardian, the potential
monetary liability of an innkeeper for the goods of his guest has
been reduced,' 2 ' and the guest has additional methods of protection
such as insurance. The solution therefore lies in restricting the lien
117 See LAVENTHOL, KREKSTEIN, HORWATH & HORWATH, LODGING INDUSTRY: 42ND AN-
NUAL REPORT ON HOTEL AND MOTOR HOTEL OPERATIONS (1974 ed.). Competition stems from
both new lodging facilities and other segments of the shelter industries (families building
second homes) as well as from increased price-sensitivity brought about by the advent of the
"budget motel."
118 See Hogan, supra note 6, at 47.
19 The Klim court intimated that the innkeeper's statute might be upheld if it were more
narrowly drawn so as not to allow seizure of all the lodger's property. 315 F. Supp. at 123-24.
120 See notes 5 & 25 supra.
121 See note 28 supra.
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in a manner consistent with the limitation on the responsibility of the
innkeeper. 122
First, the innkeeper's lien should attach to all property within
the possession of the guest for charges incurred; otherwise, the
innkeeper could easily be defrauded by a relative or other person
claiming ownership of the items within the possession of the
guest. 123 The innkeeper should be obligated to deposit the debtor's
property within the custody of a court to satisfy the creditor's claim
should he obtain a judgment.
Second, there should be a procedure permitting the guest to
challenge immediately either the factual bases of a prejudgment
seizure or the legitimacy of the creditor's claim. "The necessity for
allowing a summary challenge to both the seizure and the claim is
evident. Even though grounds for the summary seizure may exist
(e.g., the debtor is a nonresident or personal jurisdiction is not
obtainable), the creditor's claim may be unfounded."'124 A hearing
should be made available within a reasonable time and the burden of
initiating judicial proceedings should be placed upon the innkeeper.
These provisions would effect a compromise with the proponents of
a right to a prior hearing.1 25
Third, the statute should provide exemptions for certain types
of property of the guest. Those items that have no monetary value to
the innkeeper and the loss of which would cause a great hardship to
the guest or adversely affect his earning capacity should not be
subject to the lien. The effect of failing to provide for exemptions
would be to thrust the allegedly defaulting guest out onto the street
122 Note, supra note 24, at 183-86.
123 This proposition assumes that the innkeeper has no knowledge that the property
belongs to a third party. Otherwise, a lien would probably not be permitted. See, e.g., Coving-
ton v. Newberger, 99 N.C. 523, 6 S.E. 205 (1888); Cook v. Prentice, 13 Ore. 482, 11 P.226
(1896).
A number of cases involving a lien on the property of a third party brought into a hotel by
a guest have been found to be constitutional. Brown Shoe Co. v. Hunt, 103 Iowa 586, 72 N.W.
765 (1897); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Miller, 52 Minn. 516, 55 N.W. 56 (1893); L.E. Lines Music Co.
v. Holt, 332 Mo. 749, 60 S.W.2d 32 (1933).
124 Smith, Sniadach and Summary Procedures: The Constitution Comes to the Marketplace, 5
IND. L.F. 300, 319-20 (1972).
12 The dissenting judges of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Sniadach acknowledged
that a defendant may be constitutionally deprived of his property "for a limited period of time
so that the creditor can be certain that the assets are there to satisfy its judgment when once
obtained." 37 Wisc. 2d at 182, 154 N.W.2d at 269. Neither Justice Douglas's nor Justice
Harlan's opinion, however, mentioned the length of time required under the Wisconsin
procedure for disposition of a prejudgment garnishment proceeding. The Court did not
provide any guidelines concerning what constitutes a "limited period" during which a debtor
could be deprived of his property.
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with no possessions other than those he can manage to carry on his
person. 12
6
Finally, any future lien law should be consistent with the
common-law doctrine and permit only innkeepers the right to a lien.
Lodginghouses, boardinghouses, and apartment hotels are not
within the ambit of the common-law innkeeper's lien, 127 yet statu-
tory enactments now permit the operators and proprietors of such
establishments to enjoy essentially the same rights and privileges
that innkeepers possess at common law.' 28
A procedure incorporated into the New York statute that was
struck down in Blye might also be appropriate as an additional
safeguard for the guest. 129 Under that statute an innkeeper was
obligated to give notice of his claim by publication and could enforce
the sale of the property only after a specified period of time. Prior to
the expiration of that period, the guest had a right to redeem his
property by paying the reasonable charges of his lodging and the
expenses incurred by the innkeeper in attempting to enforce his
lien.
The procedure described above would be equitable. It would
provide the debtor with prompt judicial relief, and obviously essen-
tial items could not be held under the lien. Simultaneously, the
innkeeper's creditor interests would be recognized, and he would
not be substantially prejudiced by the debtor's nonresidence. Con-
cededly, there is the possibility of hardship to the guest in that some
126 Klim v.Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 123-24 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The court in Klim concluded
that CAL. CIr. CODE § 1861 (West 1971) was unconstitutional because it did not exempt from
the operation of the lien property that was essential for the health, safety, and well-being of
the owner prior to a satisfactory hearing. 315 F. Supp. at 123.
The lien does not cover property exempt from execution under federal law. As a general
rule, property belonging or relating to the operations of the United States Government is not
subject to seizure by a creditor. The clothing of a seaman, for example, "shall be exempt from
attachment, and.., any person who shall detain such clothing when demanded by the owner
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be imprisoned not more than six months
or fined not more than $500, or both." 46 U.S.C. § 563 (1970).
127 See 40 AM.Ju. 2dHotels, Motels, andRestaurants § 187, at 1050 (1968); 49 AM.JuR. 2d
Landlord and Tenant § 675, at 641 (1970).
128 Proprietors of boardinghouses were not viewed in the same light at common law as
were innkeepers.J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS § 475 (9th ed. 1878). See
also note 32 supra.
129 In codifying the innkeeper's lien, the New York legislature did not intend to adversely
affect the common-law right to the lien. Cf note 12 supra. The New York innkeeper's lien
statute recognizes the traditional relationship existing between the innkeeper and the guest,
"on account of [the guest's] accommodation, board, room and lodging, and such extras as are
furnished at [the guest's] request," (N.Y. LIEN LAW § 181 (McKinney 1966)) and accordingly
grants the innkeeper the right to retain all of the goods brought by a guest as security for the
payment of expenses incurred by the guest.
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of his goods might be temporarily detained. Moreover, certain items
that should properly be exempted from the force of the lien might
be unreasonably withheld by the innkeeper. Any injustice con-
sequently endured by the guest could, however, be mitigated by
imposing a penalty on the innkeeper for unreasonably detaining
particular assets of the guest.
CONCLUSION
The innkeeper's conduct appears to fall within the realm of
private activity rather than under the guise of state action. Con-
sequently, execution of the lien does not enable a guest to seek legal
redress on the basis that his constitutional rights have been in-
fringed. However, even should state action be found, it is exactly the
kind of extraordinary creditor interest held by an innkeeper that
prompted the Court in Sniadach and Fuentes to provide for an
exception to the normal rule requiring preseizure procedural due
process safeguards. The guest's immediate possessions are often the
only assets the creditor-innkeeper can seize to satisfy any eventual
judgment, and the removal of these items by the guest will almost
invariably render the ultimate judgment uncollectible.
Decisions construing the requirements of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause have had a long and involved
history in American judicial thinking and the long-standing exclu-
sion of the innkeeper's lien from these provisions should be sus-
tained. By superimposing the requirements of prior notice and
opportunity to be heard upon the innkeeper's lien, the Blye court
thoroughly disassociated the lien from its common-law form. Yet
public policy considerations recognized at common law require that
it retain its full potency.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed an historical doc-
trine, brought to America by the English settlers as part of their
heritage, without giving any consideration to the duties and obliga-
tions imposed by law upon the innkeeper. TheB lye court engaged in
a form of judicial legislation, undermining the objectives of section
181 of the New York Lien Law, thereby sounding its deathknell.
The separate interests of the innkeeper and the guest, and the
delicate process of accommodating their divergent views, indicate
that the court should have upheld that part of the New York Lien
Law applicable to innkeepers, thereby confining its ruling to board-
inghouses and lodginghouses. In revising the statute to conform
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with the court's decision, the New York legislature should address
itself to the policy considerations underlying the present-day status
of the innkeeper-guest relationship and accordingly enact a nar-
rowly drawn innkeeper's lien law.
Roger H. Marks
